We asked the contributors to this discussion to look at the ways in which class, race and gender interact with, or are overlooked by, nationalist politics, as part of a wider engagement with the contested relations between neoliberalism and diverse articulations of resistance. Morrison reflects on the complexities of gender within the independence movement, particularly focusing on some of the problems in the online spaces of activism that the campaign constructed. Finally, Gerry Mooney explores some of the alternative progressive imaginaries which emerged from the movement, while also highlighting the limits to the SNP' s political strategy and record in office.
These contributions, particularly when read in relation to each other, provide an invaluable dynamic sense of the intersections forged through independence/postindependence movements. They give a sense of what has been rendered significant through these movements, while also pointing to their displacement of certain key questions, especially around race, class and gender. More importantly, as Paul Griffin has suggested in his Soundings blog about the event, they point to the 'clear need for a critical engagement with the different channels of common-sense neoliberalism', and the 'importance of articulating and asserting alternatives alongside a need for trans-local forms of solidarity'. 
Neil Davidson: the SNP and crisis neoliberalism
Neoliberalism is not simply an ideology or a set of policies, although it is both of these things, but rather an entire period in the development of capitalism. It cannot therefore be reversed simply by adopting the policies typical of an earlier period. 'Back to 1945' as a goal is neither realistic -since the post-war boom was a quite exceptional period in the history of capitalism, which will not be repeated -nor desirable, given the oppressive politics of race, gender and sexuality which prevailed then. New periods tend to emerge out of economic crises, as in 1873 and 1929, and so too did neoliberalism in 1973-74. And, like any period in capitalism, it can also be subdivided into different phases -so far we have seen three.
What capitalism required by the mid-1970s was political regimes capable of restoring the rate of profit and initiating a new cycle of accumulation. 'Proto'-neoliberal governments, represented by the Callaghan government in the UK and the Carter administration in the USA, emerged at this time, but neither the Labour nor Democratic Party was capable of installing an entirely new regime for capital, at least at this point.
The first phase of neoliberalism proper -its 'vanguard' phase of initial reorientation -began with the Thatcher government of 1979 and Reagan administration of 1981. Interestingly, the English-speaking countries have tended to be at the forefront of establishing the global neoliberal regime: New Zealand and Australia were also early adopters in the mid-to-late 1980s, in both cases under the auspices of a Labour government. (Here I am referring to bourgeois-democratic conditions; the conditions under which neoliberalism was introduced in post-coup Chile and post-Mao China at around the same time were quite different.) Vanguardism lasted until the early 1990s and these years are sometimes referred to those of 'roll-back' neoliberalism -rolling back the welfare state and the power of the trade union movement.
The attack on the labour movement took a number of different forms. One was the quite conscious attempt to create mass unemployment, through measures such as the maintenance of high interest rates and the withdrawal of government financial support to certain industries, leading to levels of joblessness unseen since the 1930s. At this distance in time, we perhaps forget how shocking that was for the post-war generation, which had effectively known only full employment for nearly thirty years. The main aim was disciplinary, to make people fearful, knowing the poverty and bureaucratic humiliation that losing a job would involve (though this was of course as nothing compared with the brutality of the current DWP regime), and it acted as an 'incentive' not to challenge employers.
Secondly there was a direct onslaught on the trade unions, particularly the most powerful and militant, whose defeat would then be seen as a lesson for everyone else. In the US this meant taking on the air traffic controllers; in Britain the key group were the miners, but also the printers and the dockers. This wasn't, as is sometimes claimed, about smashing the trade union movement. The intention was to discipline them, and make sure they understood that any attempt to launch a struggle such as the 1984-85 miners' strike would be defeated by all the institutions of state, including police violence.
The third element could be described as a war of manoeuvre in the Gramscian sense. It involved closing down operations in existing unionised areas and moving them to 'greenfield' sites such as those of Silicon Valley in Scotland, the M4 Corridor in England and the Sunbelt in the US. Scotland, where the post-war staple industries of shipbuilding, engineering and car assembly still dominated the economy, was particularly badly affected, particularly in Glasgow and Dundee. By the beginning of this century something like one in ten people in Glasgow worked in a call centre, which is far more than ever worked in engineering. But it is important to understand that this process was uneven, and also involved new geographical areas of growth, above all around the oil industry in Aberdeen, which in many ways was the leading example of the emergent non-union private sector industry, at least until the aftermath of Piper Alpha disaster in 1988.
The success of these strategies ensured that when the economy did recover, the labour movement was in a relatively weak position, and successive neoliberal regimes were able to press ahead with their solutions to the declining rate of profit -privatisation, outsourcing, deregulation, unimpeded capital flows, indirect rather than direct taxation, and so on.
The second phase of neoliberalism, signalled by the 1992 election of Clinton in the US and the 1997 election of Blair in the UK, is quite widely analysed as a period of 'social' neoliberalism -of consolidation or 'roll-out'. Vanguard neoliberalism was closely associated with neo-conservatism, especially in relation to questions of race, migration, marriage, gender, and sexual orientation. (It' s incredible to think that Section 28 of the Local Government Act banning the 'promotion of homosexuality' was passed less than thirty years ago. Social neoliberalism was quite different.) This second phase showed that neoliberalism need not be socially conservative, especially in relation to questions of individual autonomy. In its rhetoric at least, all forms of non-economic inequality were regarded as illegitimate -in other words all forms other than class.
Why did the shift from vanguard to social neoliberalism take place? Here, the new middle classes or 'technical-managerial strata' are of crucial importance. This class forms between 15 and 20 per cent of the population, although it is smaller in Scotland than in England, and much bigger in London than anywhere else in the UK. Both main Westminster parties need support from a substantial part of this group, but it is not in general a socially conservative stratum. The aim was to secure their support for the neoliberal project through offering to extend to social life the freedom and individual autonomy supposedly offered by the market. In reality, to the extent that the embrace of a neoliberal version of identity politics was not purely rhetorical, any gains it allowed for were largely to the benefit of the middle classes.
Social neoliberalism retained important continuities with the vanguard phase, in particular a commitment to handing power away from the state to other institutions: one of the first actions of the Thatcher government was the abolition of exchange controls; one of the first actions of New Labour was to cede control over interest rates to an unelected committee of the Bank of England. And of course this dismantling of the economic powers of the state was accompanied by willing adherence to the European regulations on competition and freedom of movement for capital and labour. In Scotland, the dominant political party, the SNP, remains committed to social neoliberalism in both its aspects. Rhetorically, of course, one of the characteristics of the contemporary SNP is to give the impression of being much more left-wing than it actually is. This has had a contradictory effect.
On the one hand, people joined the SNP in vast numbers, and voted for the party in even greater numbers, because, in the main, they wanted a viable politics of the left. In one respect this is simply a local example of the current volatility of politics, where, if new parties, like Podemos in Spain, are not available to act as opposition to neoliberalism, existing parties are seized upon by a mobilised population for the same purpose. The campaign to elect Jeremy Corbyn as Labour Party leader is the most recent -if unexpected -example of this process of antineoliberal content seeking an organisational form.
On the other hand, the SNP is not going to transform itself into a party opposed to neoliberal capitalism, and its maintenance of a social-democratic aura can only survive for so long without delivering any actual improvements to working-class conditions. The perennial excuse that nothing can be done until independence may carry the party on until the next Scottish elections; it is unlikely to work indefinitely.
Why?
We have now entered a third phase, which opened with the financial crisis of 2007, which is rendering the contradictions of the SNP unsustainable. As I noted earlier, major crises have previously led to new periods in capitalist history, to reorganisations of the system, but this one did not. What we have instead is a new phase of neoliberalism, which might be termed 'crisis' neoliberalism. We should always be hesitant about announcing the 'final' crisis, but this new phase suggests that capitalism may be running out of options in relation to offsetting the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. For it is clear is that no-one -least of all in the UK -has a clue about how to revive the global economy. Current leaders, of whom George Osborne is exemplary, are all tactics and no strategy. Following governments of reorientation and consolidation, we now have governments of permanent exception (to adapt a concept of Carl Schmitt' s). These involve even greater harshness than the original vanguard phase, particularly in relationship to migrants and the most insecure sections of the working class -the people who are to be treated as the 'exceptions'. Yet at the same time gay marriage is now legal, so in a sense aspects of the social regime have continued even among the currently dominant group within the Tory party.
The struggle against crisis neoliberalism is not always articulated in precisely these terms. The Yes campaign 'from below' can be understood primarily as an uprising against neoliberalism that took the form of a demand for independence. But if the dawning realisation of the essential moderation of the SNP is not to lead to disillusion and a retreat from the levels of political engagement which we saw in the referendum, the radical left has to provide a viable alternative.
Satnam Virdee: Scotland: nationalism without racism?
One of the things I have taken from Stuart Hall, who has been an important influence for me, is his rejection of any neat separation of theoretical work from political practice; instead, he emphasised the importance of deep thinking -of producing critical knowledge -precisely so that it may inform better political practice. And that relationship was always reciprocal. He believed strongly that thought was an essential step towards renewing a project for transformative social change. I think this is what he meant when he spoke of 'theory being a detour to somewhere more important'.
Thirty years on, this standpoint remains as compelling as ever, as we find ourselves in another moment of systemic crisis. In Britain, the financial crisis and resulting implementation of austerity has been rapidly over-determined by a constitutional crisis that threatens to break-up the British state. In Scotland, 45 per cent of the population voted for independence, with Glasgow -historically, the second city of the British Empire -voting to secede from the Union. And by May 2015, it was clear that the SNP -the principal party of independence -had become the hegemonic force in Scottish politics. Over the same period, developments in England have taken a rather different political trajectory. On the one hand, we saw a marked shift to the right in the 2015 general election, with UKIP securing 4 million votes and the Conservatives winning a narrow majority on a pro-austerity platform; on the other hand, we have also seen the first indications of a progressive push-back in England with Jeremy Corbyn being elected leader of the Labour Party.
Given these events, and the historical and contemporaneous structuring power of racism in Britain, including its proven capacity to disorganise and fragment the multi-ethnic working class in the field of politics, it is somewhat surprising to find how little attention has been devoted to a consideration of the place of race in this emergent splintering of the Union -particularly in Scotland. 3 It is against this backdrop that I want to offer some tentative reflections about how the relationship between race and nation in Scotland is playing out in the current conjuncture.
I have been deeply struck at how rarely discussion about racism has featured amid the political awakening that occurred during the independence campaign and beyond, including among the Green and socialist left. I don't think this is new. Over many years, this relative silence has come to be interpreted by much of the Scottish population, including its political parties, as an indication of racism' s absence, and this has helped to consolidate a now powerful myth that there is 'no problem here', that, in that memorable Scottish phrase 'We're a' Jock Tamson' s bairns'. This narrative of an absent racism in Scottish history has become even more entrenched in the course of recent developments (such as the rise of the SNP and the independence referendum) because it is able to nest so comfortably within the new common sense of Scottish politics, the dominant story that has been forged -by the SNP and others -that the Scots are in some sense different from the English: more egalitarian, and more likely to place an emphasis on collectivism over individualism, and government intervention over self-reliance. And the regular public statements made by successive First Ministers welcoming increased migration, in contrast to the increasingly shrill pronouncements emanating from party leaders in Westminster, seem only to have further reinforced the myth that Scotland does not have a serious racism problem.
On one level, such elite rhetoric is welcome, particularly when it is contrasted to what is unfolding today across large parts of Europe in relation to the refugee crisis. However, this mainly SNP-led re-imagining of Scotland as different (and arguably more progressive) than England has been crafted in such a way that the historical role which Scotland played in Atlantic slavery and colonial conquest has been consigned to what George Orwell referred to as the 'memory hole', leaving us with the impression that it never happened. Or, on those rare occasions when such episodes are forced out into the open, they are implicitly projected back onto a reactionary British/English establishment. This suggests not only a degree of intellectual dishonesty but an unwillingness to confront the legacies of empire and racism in which Scotland is implicated. Further, those broadly sympathetic public statements made by elite politicians in Scotland about migration and the 'new Scots' are too often taken at face value -including by parts of the left -and this carries with it the danger of underestimating and thereby disabling the contemporary struggle against racism that is required.
It is crucial to remain alive to the disjuncture between elite discourse on migration and the lived reality of racialised minorities in Scotland. Everyday racism remains a deeply structuring force distorting the lives of those we know as the black and brown Scots. From racist harassment in the community, to systematic discrimination in the workplace, these so-called new Scots remain a class apart -one that is seen as somehow not quite Scottish. And on occasions -just as in England -this failure to imagine this group of Scots as 'truly Scottish', as 'unhyphenated Scots', can lead to violence and sometimes murder. From the still unproven racist killing of Surjit Singh Chhokar just prior to the advent of devolution in 1998 to the death of 31-year-old Sheku Bayoh while being restrained by fifteen police officers in Kirkcaldy, Fife in May 2015, racism remains a significant ongoing problem in Scottish society, irrespective of the other more progressive transformations we have seen.
So, what is to be done?
What I've tried to briefly highlight here are some of the potential pitfalls of constructing emancipatory political projects that fail to foreground questions of racism and anti-racism. Currently in Scotland, concerns about growing class inequalities, of social justice, have come to be expressed through the national question, but they have not been accompanied by any corresponding shift in consciousness on challenging racism. We on the left need not only to think more deeply about how we might come to terms with the historical and contemporaneous legacy of racism in Scotland, but also to find innovative ways of challenging its corrosive effects in the here and now -not post-independence. My suggestion is that in nations such as Scotland we cannot foreground questions of democratisation and social justice by going round race, we have to go through race. As someone who came to political consciousness in the immediate aftermath of the anti-racist social movements of the late 1970s and the municipal anti-racism of the early 1980s, I've been left puzzled by the comparative lack of fluency shown by the SNP, and much of the Scottish left, on the question of race. Leading individuals who can make complex contributions around questions of independence, class, gender and social justice seem to fall back on simplistic sloganeering when it comes to comes to understanding racism, and how to challenge it. In the kind of rapidly moving situation in which we find ourselves in Scotland -where progressive forces appear to be moving with the current for once -to raise the question of racism is almost to appear as a killjoy -interrupting the 'good vibes' that have been created in the course of the IndyRef and beyond.
Perhaps a first step to reaching beyond this current paralysis might be to recognise not only the long-established ethnic diversity of Scotland' s working class, but also to begin to actively build coalitions with those progressive civil society organisations created by the black and brown Scots, as well as more recent migrants, in the course of their attempts to challenge racism and social inequality, and secure a more stable life for their children. This kind of approach has the potential to expand the political imaginary of all social movements striving for social justice, because the prevailing conceptions of racialised national belonging at any one moment in time tend to be constructed in opposition to such folk, and their attachment to these dominant conceptions is therefore often weaker. As a result, historically, we know that their participation in working-class conflicts gave them a unique capacity to see through the fog of blood, soil and belonging, and thereby to universalise the militant, yet often particularistic, fights of the working class. Informed by their unique perspective on society, they often acted as a leavening agent, nourishing the struggles of all. Irish Catholics, Jews, Asians and Caribbeans have all played this role of catalytic agent at various points in British history over the past two centuries -as I show in my recent book Racism, Class and the Racialized Outsider.
So a fundamental question facing socialists and other progressives in Scotland today is whether or not emancipatory politics can be stretched to truly include those black and Asian Scots who have long been here, and those migrants that are newly arriving. We have a rare opportunity to unthink the old way of doing emancipatory politics in Scotland. We should take it.
Jenny Morrison: privilege, feminism and Scottish independence
The referendum debate, with its surge of mass political participation and centring of social justice, was seized as an opportunity by many feminists to challenge patriarchy. Anger at austerity, as well as at misogyny in society and in the independence movement itself, motivated women to discuss alternatives. Thus Women for Independence undeniably mobilised women and gave them a voice in the campaign. But there were also many feminists, often young, and with roots in student anti-austerity activism, who expressed a desire for radical change from the status quo through independence. And this group of 'feminist radicals' is also part of the wider upsurge in feminist activism across the UK in recent years.
Many feminist radicals also saw themselves as participating in a new form of feminism, based on their claim to be enacting intersectionality, mainly through the use of the tactics of privilege checking and calling-out. But, as Nira Yuval-Davis mentioned in the Soundings roundtable on 'Feminism and "the S-word"' in issue 61, socialist feminism has long aimed to deal with multiple, mutually constituting, forms of inequality. Importantly, however, all the speakers in the Soundings discussion emphasised the need to connect personal experience of intersecting oppressions to a movement that challenges the structures that underlie oppressive social relations. But privilege checking and calling-out have become increasingly common in young social movements, and for me this raises the issue of how useful these tactics are in building a collective feminist political force. To explore this, during the referendum debate I conducted interviews with thirty pro-independence feminist radical activists -and I saw in many of them a tendency towards individualism and moralism in the use of privilege politics. This tendency marginalised movement building, and reinforced, rather than tackled, exclusions of working-class feminists.
It is important here to understand the development of privilege checking and call-outs in context. There is a long history of progressive movements marginalising women and feminism, and the independence movement did not substantially break from that history, despite its rhetoric of openness. In the early stages of the campaign there was a significant exclusion of women, with the Yes Scotland launch infamously consisting almost entirely of men. Yet as the movement developed it was increasingly reimagined as inclusive, with women taking prominent roles across different campaign groups. However there was little discussion of feminist politics other than that relating to equal gender representation. There was also misogynistic behaviour across the campaign -from men dominating meetings or talking across women, through to reports of abusive behaviour. On the other hand, the feminist movement has an equally long history of disregarding working-class, black and LGBT voices in its ranks. Privilege checking is intended to call attention to the ways in which privileged identities -male, white, middle-class, cis, straight, able-bodied -can shape how we see and experience the world. Call-outs, similarly, are public challenges that draw attention to the ways in which a particular behaviour or use of language contributes to oppression.
In Scotland, as elsewhere, privilege checking and call-outs have emerged as attempts to make movements more intersectional. However, this has at times meant that the public acknowledgement of privilege seems to be the moral end goal of a substantial part of feminist independence activism.
Since there was no organised pro-independence feminist forum, during the referendum campaign feminists were active across many different pro-independence groups, as well as across social media. Most of the concerns raised by activistsnotably violence against women, the gendered nature of poverty and the economy, and gendered (mis)representations in the media and popular culture -are long standing fundamental issues for feminism. But many interviewees commented that a lot of space was given to talking through personal privilege -for example discussing how being white would shape how a person would see feminism -and this often ended up with people publically discussing their privileges as 'good' feminists. One interviewee felt that some activists were having their egos massaged as good feminists when they were talking through their privilege or calling-out others -through approving comments, statements of support and online 'likes'. In contrast, this interviewee felt that, in the feminist movement, 'people are just labelling you bad all the fucking time'. This labelling had arisen for two reasons: firstly, she was unsure of the correct vocabulary around trans issues; and, secondly, she was unsure of the value of seeing gender as fluid, preferring instead to see all gender as a social construction. 'Labelling' is a way of framing a difference of opinion in moral terms, and this often has the effect of sidelining the possibility of productive debate, or of building solidarity between groups of feminists. In addition, the increasing association of making a public statement of privilege with being a good person drove a moralising cycle of call-outs and privilege discussion. Meanwhile, other than rhetorically invoking structural concepts such as patriarchy or capitalism, there was little attempt to explore or challenge the complex link between structure and individual behaviour.
Similarly, call-outs have often focused reductively on correcting language deemed to be oppressive. Of course, the use of oppressive language has historically been challenged by feminists, but the strong condemnation of any error in language can be alienating for those not already familiar with feminist circles. Another interviewee mentioned that new people were 'slammed down hard' for mistakes, which did little to help women learn different forms of expression. This lack of understanding or willingness to support new activists is indicative of an understanding of language as largely an issue of individual prejudice -something that someone must personally fight to overcome. Calling-out becomes an individual moral castigation, disconnected from building collective resistance to the patriarchy structures that shape language. In addition, the roots of the new feminist radicalism in student activism mean that much of its language and expressions have been developed in largely middle-class culture. This new language is often therefore more familiar to middle-class women, who also have more time to learn new vocabularies. Yet activist language is rarely understood as class specific. Of course working-class feminists have also seen the unlearning of oppressive language as important; but when call-outs come to determine access to feminist groups along class lines, it further excludes working-class women.
Other questions are also raised. Who has the power to check privilege? And, conversely, who has their privilege checked? Despite affirmations of intersectional politics, positions of power in Scottish feminist radicalism -leaders, online admins, etc -remain disproportionately in the hands of middle-class, white, cis, and, possibly to a lesser extent, straight women. And privilege politics often fell into problems when multiple oppressions and privileges were found in a specific situation, which sometimes led to the creation of hierarchies of privilege. Another interviewee, a self-identified working-class feminist, felt unwelcome in feminist forums because of elitist attitudes from prominent members: I cannae possibly know everything, cannae possibly know everywhere to find everything … I know people who are post-op, pre-op, not wanting an op, testing the waters, in their two year living period before they can get it … so I done a bit of research, as much as I could do, and then I made the stupid mistake of using the wrong word. I never used, is it cis? Aye that one, and it was women, and they said I'm no here to educate you.
Dismissing women for not knowing something illustrates how call-outs, here through the internet phrase 'I'm not here to educate you', can reinforce middleclass privilege. Once again, knowledge and/or ignorance are seen as mere personal choices, with no consideration of how knowledge is structured by power. Additionally, the valuing of specific formal knowledge -such as knowing a particular word or definition -serves to marginalise working-class women who are less likely to develop their feminism through formal education. Working-class feminists rarely had the power to challenge their exclusion. As a result, middle-class domination of feminist culture can be obscured.
There is a justified worry that critiques of feminist activism such as this one may be appropriated by others: if we admit that privilege checking and call-outs can have oppressive outcomes, does this open the door to those who use the argument to justify anti-feminist or anti-intersectional opinions? Externally, critiques of feminist activist culture come too often from those who wish to reinforce male dominance. Internally, critiques can come from the desire of middle-class, white feminists to dismiss discussion of how privilege shapes the feminist movement. Yet, given the reality of exclusion within privilege politics, it is necessary to reconsider how we can tackle personal manifestations of privilege while not losing sight of building collective movements.
Feminist activism in Scotland has shifted somewhat in recent months. Women have begun to organise a Glasgow branch of Sisters Uncut, a direct action collective opposing cuts to services for domestic violence. While discussing privilege, they also make demands against the Conservative government to prevent cuts. Meanwhile Rise, the socialist party separate from, but involving, many RIC members, has an active women' s network. This network has held protests against rape culture, against the lack of sanitary provision for women prisoners and in favour of reproductive rights. In addition, young women are prominent in the BAME network, and election candidate Deborah Waters made campaigning for a living income for unpaid carers a central aspect of her manifesto. These groups indicate an attempt to move beyond the impasse of privilege politics. If they are to progress and build on the energy of the independence movement there is a need to develop a culture where the difficult questions of strategy and power can be debated.
Gerry Mooney: Scotland and independence: questions of social welfare, nationalism and class
In my reflections on the Scottish independence debate -the entire debate and not just the 2014 referendum itself -what has emerged is the centrality of notions of social justice, fairness, equality and so on. This is not to dismiss the role and influence of nationalism, nationalist sentiments and arguments around Scotland as a national community, but it has been rare to see these being discussed in the abstract, and particularly in isolation from these other notions.
Arguments about what kind of society a fully independent Scotland would be have often focused around ideas of social welfare -the role it would play in such a Scotland, and the extent to which it would be founded on principles of social justice and equality. And Scottish governments (led by the SNP since 2007) have had a very strong rhetorical emphasis on social welfare. Here I want to highlight three themes that emerge in these discussions.
First, there is the idea of Scotland and social justice as being uniquely Scottish in some ways: there is something that makes Scotland and the Scots an inherently progressive, democratic and egalitarian national community. These long-standing, well-versed but much criticised ideas of Scottishness are still circulating and permeating the discussion of politics and social policy making in Scotland. Sometimes it comes as a surprise -though perhaps it shouldn't -that people you think would know better appear to buy into the idea that there is some vague and tenuous but nonetheless potent force at work in Scotland which is essentially progressive. This recurring idea of Scottish distinctiveness can be used to side-track and undermine a more critical understanding of contemporary Scottish society -including its unequal structure, and foundation on class inequalities. Such an understanding needs to be carried forward into ideas and arguments about what a future Scotland would look like. Indeed, a critical debate about Scottishness and the underlying drivers of Scottish society is desperately required -and long overdue.
Second, in the hands of the SNP in particular, though this is not confined to the SNP, the idea of Scotland as progressive on social welfare is used as a way of distinguishing Scotland from the rest of the UK. In particular it' s been used to distance Scotland from England. So all the 'bad' things in welfare and welfare 'reform', as well as other policies taking place in England (for example school academies, privatisation of the NHS) are seen as driven by a London-based government that was/is seriously out of tune with Scottish values and aspirations. That the Tory government today, and its Coalition, and indeed New Labour, predecessors were also out of touch with huge tranches of 'England' tends to be overlooked: it is simply argued that a punitive and harsh welfare regime is not aligned with the principles that inform Scottish society.
Third, the idea of independence itself is hugely abstract. What does it really mean to say that Scotland could be 'independent'? Independent from what exactly? Adopting a critical approach means that we can see that the SNP' s vision of an independent Scotland is fundamentally about constitutional change. There is little in that vision -though to be fair there are competing visions -that foregrounds the need to tackle the foundations of present-day inequalities in Scotland, namely the vested interests which make Scotland the divided place it is today.
The dominant (SNP-generated) vision of an independent Scotland is very narrow and limited, and leaves the privileged interests of Scotland' s upper classes largely untouched. But at the same time the SNP has focused on social welfare issues as a means of concretising independence, and making it seem less abstract: thus an independent Scotland would have a better welfare state, more social security and a more progressive and fairer approach to welfare claimants. There would be no place for the hostile narratives and punitive policies that characterise the UK government' s approach to welfare policy.
However, a critique of these different strands of the argument that Scotland is a uniquely egalitarian national community is not the same thing as a claim that there are no observable political differences in Scotland. It is important to recognise that the political and policy-making landscape Scotland has unique aspects. Here I would emphasise the role that socialist parties, the radical independence campaign/ RISE, Common Weal, the Scottish Green Party, activists and campaigning groups and organisations have played in generating this different landscape. One positive development has been that devolution, initially, and the Scottish independence debate more recently, has opened up a space for discussions about social welfare and the future direction of social welfare in Scotland. There are discussions taking place around these issues, at both a political and policy level, which differ in important respects from the dominant discussions around welfare elsewhere in these islands, particularly in England. But there are (at least!) two major problems in the way in which this has been picked up by the SNP.
The first of these I would describe as a 'back to the future' approach: the SNP' s model of social welfare, and their vision of a Scottish welfare state (though it is sometimes difficult to identify a coherent vision), as articulated for example in Scottish government announcements and policy documents, and in speeches by leading SNP politicians, are broadly based on the idea that a future independent Scottish welfare state would be 'something like' the pre-1979, pre-Thatcherite UK welfare state. Alex Salmond often said that an independent Scotland would act as a progressive beacon to the rest of the UK by holding onto the founding principles of the post-1945 Keynesian-Beveridgean welfare state. It is hugely ironic that in 2014 the SNP were calling for a pro-independence vote in the hope that this would be a way of defending one of the key instruments of postwar Britishness. And we need to be cautious about this invocation of an uncritically imagined, golden age, welfare state, meeting the needs of all UK citizens in a truly universalist manner. As Tom Nairn wrote some years ago, nationalism is Janus-faced: it looks simultaneously backwards and forwards, drawing upon specific histories or historical constructions to enable a particular vision of the future.
The second main problem is that the SNP offers a rather vague and undeveloped notion of what a fully Scottish welfare state would look like, its underlying principles and drivers. While talk of fairness and equality is to be welcomed, much of it is hugely vague. (And it is also important to acknowledge, once again, that the SNP tends to articulate its vision in terms of a welfare state, indeed a society, that is reflective of progressive Scottish values and attitudes.) I would argue, however, that excavating the underlying assumptions that provide the building blocks of such a society reveals a neoliberal vision. The future Scotland would be a market-based, market-driven economy. It would be competitive, lean and efficient, and have low corporation tax, encouraging enterprise and economic growth, which will deliver a prosperity that will be beneficial for the whole of Scottish society. There is no perceived contradiction at all between the goal of a globally competitive Scottish society and the need to address the other main social problems that scar that society. In some ways -and I apologise for using this term -we have the makings of a tartan third way. One of the key planks in the New Labour idea of a Third Way was that competition and cohesion could work together for the wider social good. It is important that the SNP should be taken on in relation to their broadly similar underlying neoliberal vision, albeit one that is dressed up in a more progressive rhetoric.
The third major problem with the SNP approach -and this has been implicit in some of the other arguments advanced thus far -is what it has to say about the question of the state. What shape and form would a Scottish state take? Would it be progressive and therefore reflect Scottish values, attitudes and aspirations? Do we defend that state, do we critique that state, or do we mobilise and articulate a very different vision of such a state? Imagining what a different Scottish state would look like is absolutely central to the debate. But the SNP, together with the other main political parties in Scotland today, has little notion of 'the state' as such. While Labour has a heritage of a reforming welfare state, the SNP have no such ideological tradition to call upon. Therefore we once again return to the symbolic position of a Scottish welfare state as core to its vision of an independent Scotland. However, behind this rhetoric of a one-nation Scotland -led and supported by a beneficent (welfare) state -there are already some signs of what an independent Scottish state might really be like -if it reflects the actual practice of the SNP in government thus far. The SNP government has operated with a top-down vision of Scottish society, and has felt it necessary to impose order and control 'from above'. The criminalisation of working-class football fans, for instance, and their subjection to extremely harsh and punitive policing, does not fit very well with notions of a socially just, social-democratic and socially inclusive Scotland.
Finally, we need to highlight the question of class. The idea of class is completely missing from the SNP' s vision, which is very much that of a one-nation Scotland, thereby marginalising some of the key divisions and inequalities that make Scotland a highly unequal society. It is a thankless task to try to identify any understanding of class in any SNP document or speech. Instead, it deploys a range of euphemisms: the socially excluded, the marginalised and the less well-off. Here is a language that reflects class, without invoking the term itself: somehow, a Scottish state will be able act in the interest of everyone, pulling-together people from different social classes to generate a classless society. The underpinning drivers of poverty -profit-making, wealth accumulation and structural inequalities -would somehow remain in place, but in some vague and uncertain way they would be less socially damaging.
As we collectively develop our ideas as to the nature of an independent Scotland, we should not accept the notion that it would 'of course' be a more equal or egalitarian society, a better society, if only we had a wee bit more welfare and the like. Our failure to articulate an alternative and truly radical critical analysis and explanation of the main fault-lines and underlying social relations that shape Scotland today can only lead to a highly limited vision of an independent Scotland -not so different from that advocated by the SNP. There are groups and parties in Scotland now fighting to get such an alternative vision onto the agenda, and to this end I hope I have made a contribution here to the making of that vision.
Notes

